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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENTS
NECESSITATED BY THE DELINQUENCY OF SOME LAND
OWNERS IN A SPECIAL ASSESSMENT DISTRICT
Most states have constitutional provisions requiring expressly or in effect,
equality and uniformity of taxation. Under these constitutional requirements,
it is usually held that the legislatures acting under their general taxing power,
are not prohibited from making geographical classifications for purposes o.f
taxation so long as they are reasonable and based upon a substantial distinction. 1 However, the equality and uniformity provisions do require that all
members of the same class be taxed alike. 2 This limitation does not require
meticulous adjustments to avoid incidental hardships upon some member of
the same class, but requires only substantial uniformity.3 Since special assessments 4 are within the general taxing power of the legislature, they are subject
to these same limitations.
The basis for special assessments rests upon the ground that special
burdens may be imposed for special or peculiar benefits accruing from public
improvements, 6 land according to the weight of authority, the legislature has
a large discretion in determining what lands will be specially behefited by a
local improvement and thus subject to the burden of paying for the improvement.7 However, in matters of special assessments, th power of the legisla1. Davis v. Pelfrey, 285 Ky. 298, 147 S. W. '2d 723 (1941); Leonard v. Maxwell,
216 N. C. 89, 3 S. E. 2d 316 (1939) ; Snyder v. Maxwel, 217 N. C. 617, 9 S. E. 2d 19
(1940) ; Schwartz v. Essex County Board of Taxation, 129 N. J. L. 129, 28 A. 2d 482
(1942); People v. Marvin, 271 N. Y. 219, 2 N. E. 2d 634 (1936); McCutchan v.
Oklahoma Tax Commission, 191 Okla. 578, 132 P. 2d 337 (1943) ; Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 332 Pa. 465, 3 A. 2d 267 (1938).
2. Frazier v. State Tax Commission, 234 Ala. 353, 175 So. 402 (1937) ; Henry v.
Shevinsky, 239 Ala. 293, 195 So. 222 (1940) ; Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 332 Pa. 465,
3 A. 2d 267 (1938) ; City of Hampton v. Insurance Co. of North America, 177 Va. 494, 14
S. E. 2d 396 (1941).
3. Commonwealth v. Southern Pennsylvania Bus Co., 339 Pa. 521, 15 A. 2d 375 (1940).
4. The term -special or local assessment is used to signify a charge imposed to pay
for a local improvement and levied only on that property which through its location
derives a benefit from the improvement. Village of Morgan Park v. Wiswall, 155 Ill.
262, 40 N. E. 611 (1895); Detroit v. Chapin, 112 Mich. 588, 71 N. W. 149 (1897).
Although the terms special assessment and tax are sometimes used synonymously,
there is a difference between them. Taxes are assessed against the individual and become
a charge against his property generally, whereas special assessments, being for benefits
conferred on the specific property, become a charge only against it and liability for the
charge is confined to the particular property benefited. In re Walker River Irr. Dist., 44
Nev. 321, 195 Pac. 327 (1921).
5. Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240 (1866) ; Howe v. Cambridge, 114 Mass. 388 (1874);
People ex rel. Scott v. Pitt, 169 N. Y. 521, 62 N. E. 662 (1902) ; Houck v. Little River
Drainage Dist., 239 U. S. 254 (1915) ; Valley Farms Co. v. Westchester, 261 U. S. 155
(1923).
6. County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691 (1880); Illinois Central Railroad
Company v. Decatur, 147 U. S. 190 (1893); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548 (1897).
7. Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 304, 311 (1898); Therefore, it has been held
that once the legislature determines that property will be benefited by the creation of an
improvement district, "...
that determination is conclusive on the landowners, and-they
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ture is not unlimited. There is a line, although in many cases it is not clear,
beyond which the legislature may not go without infringing a person's right
of property guaranteed by the State and Federal Constitutions.8 Where is this
point beyond which the legislatures are not permitted to tread? It is the
purpose of this comment to show where the courts have attempted to draw
this line in connection with a particular fact situation.
Suppose a local improvement is authorized and a special tax district is
created, a practice which is ordinarily followed in order to insure the uniformity required by the state constitution. Bonds are then issued by the tax
district to finance the improvement and a special assessment imposed upon all
the lands in the district to be benefited by the improvement. If some of the
landowners become delinquent in the payment of their assessment, can the
legislature authorize an additional assessment to be imposed upon the lands
of the other taxpayers without infringing the uniformity and equality provisions of the state constituion? If the answer is in the affirmative, is this not
holding a person responsible for the cost of benefits conferred upon the land
of his neighbor? And if the answer is no, the effect is to penalize the bondholders by delaying payment or defaulting on the bonds which would impede
their marketability and in many instances render the performance of the local
improvement impossible since the security would be made indefinite.
Suppose the additional assessment when combined with the original
exceeds the benefits conferred upon the land of the prompt taxpayer. Can it
be imposed consistently with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution? If the answer is yes, then does this not
negate the very basis for justifying the imposition of a special assessment?
"Local assessments can only be constitutional when imposed to pay for local
improvements, clearly conferring special benefits on the properties assessed,
and to the extent of those benefits." 9 If the answer is no, what about the argument against penalizing the bondholders?
In the often cited case of Norris v.Montemum Valley IrrigationDist., 10
an action was brought by a bondholder of an irrigation district for a writ of
mandamus to compel the board of county assessors to levy an additional
assessment against the lands within the district. The district bad issued bonds
for the purpose of financing the construction of an irrigation system. A special
assessment was levied against all the property in the district and as a result of
the delinquency of some taxpayers, the certificates of the plaintiff and others
were unpaid although long overdue. The funds of the district were insufficient
are not entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard upon the question of benefits to
their lands." It re Harper Irr. Dist., 108 Ore. 598, 216 Pac. 1020, 1027 (1923).
8. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269 (1898).
9. Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 146, 157 (1870).
10. 248 Fed. 369 (C. C. A. 8th 1918), cert. denied, 248 U. S. 569 (1918).
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to meet these legitimate and expected obligations and the only way the neces-'
sary funds could be raised was by the remedy sought-an additional assessment. All legal proceedings available against the delinquent property had been
resorted to and had availed nothing. The delinquent property had been put up
for sale but there were no buyers. In such a case should the additional assessment be permitted? The defendant contended that an additional assessment
would violate the uniformity provision of the state constitution since the
prompt taxpayers would bear a greater cost for the improvement..In rejecting
this contention and holding that the additional assessment could be constitutionally imposed, the court through judge Munger declared, "It is a common
provision in the state constitutions and statutes that assessments or levies for
iaxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects, or by value. Such
provisions are not violated, when, after the lapse o f a reasonable time, and
after reasonable efforts have been 'made to colledt the first levy, an additional
levy is made upon all the property in the district because of the failure of some
taxpayers to pay their portions of the first levy." 11
And in Gates v. Sweitzer 12 where a similar set of facts was presented,
the court in upholding the additional assessment declared, "It has been
generally held under Constitutions requiring uniformity of taxation, that such
provisions are not violated wheA, after the lapse of reasonable time and after
reasonable efforts have been made to collect the first levy, an additional levy is
made upon all the property in the district because of the failure of some, of the
taxpayers to pay their portions of the first levy." 13
Will not the holding in these two cases place the burden upon one for the
benefits conferred upon the lands of another? Suppose a local improvement
is authorized and a special tax district is created embracing all the property to
be benefited by the improvement. Could an assessment be constitutionally
imposed upon land outside the district, which will not be benefited? Clearly
not. "Local assessments can only be constitutional when imposed to pay for
local improvements, clearly conferring special benefits on the property
assessed." 14
Again suppose an improvement is authorized which will benefit only a
portion of a tax district. Can a special assessment be constitutionally imposed
upon all the property in the district including those lands not to be benefited?
Again the answer is no; "it is clear that all of the state cannot be taxed for
the exclusive benefit of a part of the state, nor all of Any taxing district for
the sole benefit of a part of the taxing district." 15 Then, if it is. neces11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 374
347 Ill. 353, 179 N. E. 837 (1932).
179 N. E. at 841.
65 Pa. at 157.
1 COOLEY, TAXATION § 318 (4th ed. 1924).
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sary to confer benefits on property in order constitutionally to impose upon
it a special assessment for a local improvement, how can an additional assessment placed on tax paying property necessitated by the delinquencies of others
be upheld? Are not both cases in practical effect the same? In both cases the
objection is the payment of assessments imposed for benefits conferred upon
the land of another.
According to Judge Amidon no valid distinction exists. In his strong
dissenting opinion in the Norris case, he declared: "The scheme of the
statute does not contemplate that one piece of land shall be responsible for
the default of another in the payment 9f special assessments which the law
authorizes ...even if such were the scheme when properly construed, the result would be a violation both of the state and the federal Constitution." 16
True, the state courts concluded that the additional assessment did not violate
the uniformity clause of the state constitution, but does it violate the Federal
Constitution? According to Kadow v. Paul 17 the answer is no. "Supplemental
assessments, in providing for the payment for such improvements, are recognized as a legitimate part of the proceeding necessary to raise the money and
to pay bonds issued to meet the cost; and if, in the process of collection, it shall
appear that some of the assessed land fails to pay the assessment and is
appropriated and sold, the distribution of the deficit thus arising, to be
included in another assessment,.is only meeting the to be expected cost of
the improvement. When the operation of the law works uniformly as against
all parts of the assessment district, and results in a higher cost of the improvement on all owners of land who have paid, it violates no constitutional right of
theirs." 18
Although the Supreme Court has held contrary to Judge Amidon's
dissenting opinion in the Norris case, his words were not spoken in vain, for
one year later the case of Interstate Trust Co. v. Montezuma Valley Irrigation
Dist.19 was decided, the court saving -To hold that one owner is liable for the
assessments due for benefits conferred upon the land of his neighbor would
be violative of both state and federal constitutions .
,, 20 In commenting upon
the Norris case, the court declared: "That opinion, while persuasive, is not
controlling, and was by a divided court, with a strong logical and convincing
,, 20"
dissenting opinion .
According to Cosman v. Chestnut Valley Irr. Dist.21 the prompt taxpayer
has no reason to complain since he will not ultimately be held liable for the
16. 248 Fed. at 375.

17. 274 U. S. 175 (1927).
18. Id. at 181.

19. 66 Colo. 219, 181 Pac. 123 (1919).
20. 181 Pac. at 125.,
20a. Ibid.
21. 74 Mont. 111, 238 Pac. 879 (1925).
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cost af benefits conferred upon the land of his neighbor. In that case the
plaintiff, a landowner in an irrigation district sought to enjoin the district
commissioner from imposing an additional assessment upon his land to make
up the deficiency caused by the delinquencies of other lansowners in the same
district. The court, in upholding the assessment declared: "But plaintiff apparently loses sight of the fact that when lands are sold for delinquent assessments, the proceeds of the sale pass to the credit of the irrigation district.
This money may be used in .paying bonded indebtedness and thus reduces the
plaintiff's next assessment ....

Plaintiff thus is presumed to receive back in

money, or in an interest of the irrigation district in the lands sold for delinquent
taxes, approximately the amount which was added to his assessment to make
up the delinquent taxes .
,, 22 In such a situation all is ultimately the same as
it was before.the additional assessment was imposed, the delinquent land is sold
for the amount of the indebtedness, the proceeds applied t6 the district's
indebtedness and the prompt taxpayer's future assessments will be reduced
accordingly. However, this case proceeds upon the assumption that the
delinquent land will sell for the amount of the delinquency or more. In such
a case, the only question presented is, who should bear the burden of the delay
necessarily entailed by the sale of the land, the taxpayer or the bondholder?
In essence, the same arguments as are used for and against imposing the
additional assessment, are presented in this case: if the bondholder is held
liable for the delay, the marketability of the bonds would be adversely affected,
and if the taxpayer is held liable, such a burden would tend to ,create further
delinquencies since it necessitates the imposition of an additional assessment
in the interim, which is often in excess of the taxpayer's ability to pay. Which
holding is the more just? In the Norris and Gates cases the courts established
as conditions precedent to the validity of an additional assessment the lapse
of a reasonable time and reasonable efforts to collect the first levy. If reasonable efforts were not made to collect the first levy, would an additional assessment have been permitted? Apparently not,2 3 although it is held discretionary
in the courts. 24 In denying this relief, the courts proceed upon the theory that it
would be inequitable to impose the burden upon the taxpayer until it is
definitely established through reasonable efforts to collect the first levy that
the additional assessment is absolutely necessary. By so holding, the courts
22. 238 Pac. at 881.

23. In Wayne County Sav. Bank v. Supervisor of Township of Roscommon, 97 Mich.
630, 56 N. W. 944 (1893) a bond holder petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the
defendant to assess on the taxable property in the township an amount sufficient to pay the
principal and interest on bonds which he held and which were issued by the township. The
assessment was made and since only a portion was collected, the plaintiff petitioned -for a
second writ of mandamus to compel the defendant to assess an additional amount to make
up for the uncollected portion of the first assessment. The court denied the relief sought
since the delinquent land had not been sold.
24. State ex rel. Frazer v. Holt County Court, 135 Mo. 533, 37 S. W. 521 (1896).
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place the burden of the collector's negligence or failure to act upon the bondholders. Clearly that burden adversely affects the marketability of the bonds.
If the delinquent property is sold for an amount insufficient to make up
the deficiency, the majority of jurisdictions hold the prompt taxpayers responsible for the deficiency on the theory that the obligation of the district is
general against all the lands in the district. 25 This is in spite of the unfairness
of holding every tract of land in a special tax district surety for the payment
of the special assessment on every other tract therein. "A relevy will require
those taxpayers who have already paid their full assessments to contribute towards the payment of the delinquencies of those who have failed to pay their
taxes. This unequal and unfair burden may legally be imposed upon the taxpayer who promptly pays his taxes... ." , 26 Such a burden is considered unfair
since it imposes a charge on one for the delinquency of another. It is considered
unequal since it imposes a greater burden upon the prompt taxpayers for the
cost of improvement. However, it is constitutionally imposed since the
district's obligation is considered general upon all lands within the district
and each landowner is a surety for the payment of the assessment on other
27
lands within the district.
But suppose the additional assessment when combined with the original
exceeds the amount of the benefits conferred upon the taxpayer's land. Would
the amount of the assessment in excess of the benefits violate the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution?
According to Norwood v. Baker2 8 the answer is yes. In that case the
entire cost for the construction of a road, including the cost of condemning
his own land, was assessed against the same taxpayer. As to the assessment
beyond the benefits conferred, the Court declared: "In bur judgment, the
exaction from the owner of private property of the cost of a public improvement in substantial excess of the special benefits accruing to him is, to the
extent of such excess, a taking under the guise of taxation, of private property
for public use without compensation." 29 This seems to have been a reversal
30
of the Court's previous stand. Twelve years earlier in Spencer v. Merchant,
the Supreme Court had declared: "The question of special benefit and the
property to which it extends is of necessity a question of fact, and when the
'25. American Falls Reservoir Dist. v. Thrall, 39 Idaho 105, 228 Pac. 236 (1924);

In re Lovelock Irr. Dist., 51 Nev. 215, 273 Pac. 983 (1929) ; Noble v. Yancey, 116 Ore.

356, 241 Pac. 335 (1925) ; State ex rel. Clancy v. Columbia Irr. Dist. of Stevens County,
121 Wash. 79, 208 Pac. 27 (1922).
26. Miners & Merchants Bank v. Herron, 46 Ariz. 71, 47 P. 2d 430, 433 (1935).
27. Noble v. Yancey, 116 Ore. 356, 241 Pac. 335 (1925).
28. 172 U. S.269 (1898).
29. Id. at 279. Accord, Fay v. Springfield, 94 Fed. 409 (C. C. S. D. Mo. 1899);
Cowley v. Spokane, 99 Fed. 840 (C. C. D. Wash. 1900) ; Charles v. Marion, 100 Fed.
538 (C. C. D. Ind. 1900) ; Zehnder v. Barber Asphhlt Paving Co., 106 Fed. 103 (C. C. D.
Ky. 1901) ; State v. Mayor of Newark, 35 N. J. L. 157 (1871).
30. 125 U. S. 345 (1888).
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legislature determines it in a case 'ithin its general power, its decision must
of course be final." 31 The cases were in accord with this holding until the
Now-ood case was decided.
32
Two years after the Norwood case came French v. Barber 4sphalt Co.,
where the Supreme Court was confronted with the same problem. Although
the facts were different in that the entire assessment was not placed upon a
single taxpayer, the same issue was involved. The plaintiff contended that an
apportionment of the cost of paving a street upon the abutting lots without
regard to benefits was unconstitutional. In rejecting this argument, tle Court
went back to the holding in the Spencer case and declared in effect that
special assessments to be unconstitutional must be arbitrary or unreasonable
and that it is not sufficient that they be in excess of benefits conferred. How
does this compare with the Norwood case? That was the question the plaintiff
asked in vain because the Nor-ood holding was restricted to its own facts.
The guiding principle set out in the French case has been affirmed in subsequent decisions. In Wagner v. Baltimore,33 the Court declared; "[T] he general
taxing systems of the States are not to be presumed to be lacking in due process of law because of inequalities or objections, as long as arbitrary action is
avoided. It is not the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to interfere with
the discretionary power of the States to raise necessary revenues by imposing
taxes and assessments upon the property within their jurisdictions." 34
The Norwood holding, however, formed the basis for decisi6ns'in many
state courts. In Sears v. Boston 35 which involved a special assessment for
the cost of watering streets, the court declared in making reference to the
Norwood case: "It is now established by the highest judicial authority that
.such assessments cannot be so laid upon any estate as to be in substantial
excess of the benefit received." 36 However, some state courts held to the
same effect before the Norwood case was decided. 37 In State v. Hoboken 3s
an improvement of a street was authorized and the special assessment imposed was in excess of the benefits conferred. The court held in effect that
the assessment in excess to the benefits constituted a taking of private property
for public purpose without compensation. And in McCormack v. Patchin,39
31. Id. at 353.
32. 181 U. S. 324 (1901).
33. 239 U. S. 207 (1915).
34. Id. at 216. Accord, Houck v. Little River Drainage Dist., 239 U. S. 254 (1915);
Valley Farms v. Westchester, 261 U. S.155 (1923); Memphis & CharlestoA R. Co., v.
Pace, 282 U. S. 241 (1931); Nashville, C. & St. L. R. v. Walters, 294 U. S. 405
(1935) ; Georgia R. & El. Co. v. Decatur, 295 U. S. 165 (1935) ; Carmichael v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S.495 (1937).
35. 173 Mass. 71, 53 N. E. 138 (1899).
36. 53 N. E. at 139.
37. Thomas v. Gain, 35 Mich. 155 (1876); Tide-Water Co. v. Coster, 18 N. J.Eq.
519 (1867) ; Bogert v. City of Elizabeth, 27 N. J.Eq. 568 (1876).
38. 36 N.J. L. 291 (1873).
39. 53 Mo. 33 (1873).
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the Supreme Court of Missouri declared: "The whole theory of local taxation
or assessment is, that the improvements, for which they are levied, afford a
remuneration in the way of benefits. A law which would attempt to make one
person or a given number of persons, under the guise of local assessments,
pay a general revenue for the public at large, would not be an exercise of the
taxing power, but an act of confiscation." 40
Even in states which hold that a special assessment which exceeds the
benefits conferred is unconstitutional, a decided lack of harmony exists
among the cases with respect to the extent of the benefits necessary to validate
a special assessment. Some courts hold the assessment valid so long as the
benefits are not substantially 4' or unreasonably 42 exceeded by the assessment.
Others still maintain the amount of the benefits must at least be equivalent to
the assessments in order to-hold the assessment valid. 43
THOMAS A. THOIAS
40. Id. at 36.
41. Harmon v. Bolley, 187 Ind. 511, 120 N. E. 33 (1918); Mittman v. Farmer, 162
Iowa 364, 142 N. W. 991 (1913); Hammond v. Winder, 100 Ohio St. 433, 126 N. E.
409 (1919); Wilkins v. Hillman, 45 Okla. 451, 145 Pac. 1111 (1914); King v. Portland,
38 Ore. 402, 63 Pac. 2 (1900) ; Hutcheson v. Storrie, 92 Tex. 685, 51 S. W. 848 (1899).
42. Weed v. Boston, 172 Mass. 28. 51 N. E. 204 (1898).
43. Harlan v. Town of Bel Air, 178 Md. 260, 13 -A. 2d 370 (1940) ; State ex reL
Oliver Iron Min. Co. v. City of Ely, 129 Minn. 40, 151 N. W. 545 (1915); Wilson v.

Trenton, 61 N. J. L. 599, 40 Atl. 575 (1898) ; Willard v. Morton, 50 Wyo. 72, 59 P. 2d
338 (1936).

